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Lessons from the British and
American Approaches to Compelled
Decryption
As society careens faster and faster into the digital age,
the amount of information stored electronically will only
continue to grow.1 This proliferation of electronic storage has
given rise to new threats to data security, both legal and
illegal.2 To protect against these extrinsic threats, people have
increasingly turned to data encryption, a process that renders
data unintelligible to unauthorized viewers.3 Due to the limits
of current technology, encryption software programs, some of
which are available free to the public,4 can render data
virtually indecipherable without access to the appropriate
encryption key or password.5 Encryption is a “double-edged
1

The amount of data stored electronically has grown exponentially in the
last several decades. See generally Larry Swezey, It’s Happening Now: This Is the Tera
Era of Data Storage, COMPUTER TECH. REV., Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.wwpi.com/
index.php?view=article&id=6146.
2
Illegal threats to electronically stored data include identity theft, corporate
espionage, phishing, etc. See generally Terrence Berg, The Changing Face of
Cybercrime: New Internet Threats Create Challenges to Law Enforcement, 86 MICH. B.J.
18, 18 (2007).
3
See generally infra note 14; see also Press Release, PGP Corp., Aberdeen
Group Research Reveals Increased Use of Encryption by Top Performing, Best-in-Class
Companies (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.pgp.com/insight/newsroom/
press_releases/aberdeen_group_research.html (“[T]he use of encryption to protect
sensitive data in the enterprise is becoming even more pervasive . . . .”).
4
A powerful encryption software program, named TrueCrypt, can be
downloaded free of charge at the TrueCrypt web site. TrueCrypt, Downloads,
http://www.truecrypt.org/downloads (last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
5
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher, with regard to the government’s
efforts to decrypt seized encrypted files, a Secret Service agent testified “that it is
nearly impossible to access these encrypted files without knowing the password. . . .
The only way to get access without the password is to use an automated system which
repeatedly guesses passwords. According to the government, the process . . . could take
years . . . .” In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007
WL 4246473, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D.
Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); see also D. Forest Wolfe, The Government’s Right to Read:
Maintaining State Access to Digital Data in the Age of Impenetrable Encryption, 49
EMORY L.J. 711, 712 (2000) (“Modern computerized cryptography uses encryption
algorithms to keep digital information private, and the most complex of these
algorithms can encode data so thoroughly that it would take millennia to decipher it
with current technology.” (citations omitted)); see infra Part II.B. Of course, future
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sword,” and can be used by criminals and ordinary citizens
alike.6 This presents a major dilemma for law enforcement
officials, who, without the proper legal mechanisms, would be
practically powerless to gather electronic evidence in the face of
widespread encryption.7
Because the trend towards the ever increasing use of
data encryption is not confined to the United States, the
aforementioned dilemma is an issue for law enforcement
agencies around the world. Despite being faced with the same
problem, countries have adopted different solutions. In
particular, the United States and Great Britain have
approached the dilemma in vastly different fashions.
Great Britain has taken a direct, and decidedly pro-law
enforcement, approach. Under Part III of the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act (“RIPA”), various British
governmental actors are empowered to compel decryption and
criminally charge citizens who refuse to comply.8 This statute
has drawn criticism from a variety of groups, ranging from civil
rights activists to citizens concerned about the deleterious
effect the statute could have on the British economy.9
The United States has adopted an entirely different
approach.10 Unlike Great Britain, the United States has, as of
now, declined to statutorily grant law enforcement the power to
compel decryption.11 Due to this lack of statutory guidance, the
issue of compelled decryption has been left to the judiciary.
Although case law on the subject is extremely limited, at least
one early decision has analyzed this problem under Fifth
advances in technology are hard to predict, and there could be major advances in either
encryption or encryption-cracking technology. It is part of an ongoing struggle between
those creating more powerful encryption and those creating more powerful computers
to break encryption. See Dawn Walton, A Quantum Leap in Information Security,
GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 3, 2007, at B9 (discussing a very advanced form of encryption in
development called quantum cryptography).
6
Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement at Hearing of
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government
Information on “The Encryption Debate: Criminals, Terrorists, And the Security Needs
of Business and Industry” (Sept. 3, 1997), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/
press/199709/970903.html (“As with other dual-use technologies, encryption has both
good and bad uses.”).
7
Infra Part I.B.
8
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, ch. 23, §§ 49-56 (Eng.).
9
See infra Part IV.A.
10
Jeffrey Yeates, CALEA and the RIPA: The U.S. and the U.K. Responses to
Wiretapping in an Increasingly Wireless World, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 125, 141
(2001) (“Significantly, [under CALEA] telecom carriers have no responsibility to
decrypt any encrypted communications or ensure that law enforcement can do so.”).
11
See generally id.
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Amendment jurisprudence.12 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena to
Boucher, a magistrate judge in the District of Vermont ruled
that the federal government could not compel a citizen to turn
over his encryption password because doing so would infringe
upon his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.13
Both approaches are decidedly problematic, albeit in
different ways. The British approach, while highly protective of
law enforcement interests, encroaches too far on individual
civil liberties. The American approach, as typified by Boucher,
while adequately protecting civil liberties, leaves the
government without the proper tools to effectively fight crime
in a digital age. The consequences of the ubiquitous use of
unbreakable encryption by criminals like terrorists, hackers,
child pornographers, and members of organized crime
syndicates, to name a few, would be devastating.14 This Note
12

The first case, as far as my research has revealed, to deal with this issue is
In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher, which analyzed the issue under Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher I), No.
2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009
WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). Notably, on February 19, 2009, the decision was
reversed by District Judge William K. Sessions on narrow grounds. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher II), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19,
2009); see also infra note 50. Judge Sessions held that, due to a body of law called the
foregone conclusion doctrine, the defendant would not be able to resist the
governmental order to turn over his password. Boucher II, 2009 WL 424718, at *3-4;
see also infra notes 104-111 and accompanying text. This narrow holding does not alter
the following analysis because where the foregone conclusion doctrine does not apply,
defendants could still seek refuge in the Fifth Amendment.
13
Boucher II, 2009 WL 424718, at *3.
14
In a 1997 press release, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) stated,
We are all acutely aware of, and concerned about, the “bad” uses of
encryption by criminals, who want to thwart police surveillance of their
criminal activities, and by spies, who engage in activities harmful to our
national security. The Working Group report contains startling estimates of
50 to 100 percent in the future annual growth rates for criminal uses of
encryption. Even if the impact on law enforcement is not great now, the
potential future impact is alarming.
Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement at Hearing of Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information on “The
Encryption Debate: Criminals, Terrorists, And the Security Needs of Business and
Industry” (Sept. 3, 1997), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/199709/
970903.html; see also Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing
on H.R. 850 Before the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Janet
Reno, Att’y Gen. of the United States), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
archive/ag/testimony/1999/agarmed071399.htm (“[I]t will become far more difficult for
the FBI, DEA, and other federal, state, and local, law enforcement agencies, faced with
the rising threat from the criminal use of commercially available encryption, to protect
the public from crimes such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, economic fraud, and
child pornography.”).
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examines both methods and argues that America should devise
a new approach by drawing upon the strengths of each tack
and devise a middle ground that provides for both effective law
enforcement and adequate protection of civil liberties.
Part I of this Note briefly describes the history and
technical background of encryption. Then, Part II discusses the
American approach to compelled decryption and the
application of the Fifth Amendment, while Part III analyzes
the British approach of statutorily compelled decryption. Next,
Part IV discusses the criticisms levied at both of the
approaches and proposes a statutory middle ground based, in
part, on the federal wiretap statute in the Omnibus Crime
Control Statute. Finally, the Note concludes with a reiteration
of the notion that both approaches have fundamental flaws and
that American policy makers should consider adopting a
middle ground.
I.

HISTORY AND TECHNICAL BACKGROUND OF ENCRYPTION

The goal of encryption is to safeguard important data
from unauthorized viewing by third parties.15 Although modern
encryption in its digital form is a relatively recent innovation,
more primitive forms have been in existence for thousands of
years.16 With the passage of time and advances in technology,
encryption techniques have grown immensely more
sophisticated.17 Currently, freely available software can render
data virtually undecipherable without the proper password or
encryption key.18
A.

History and Background of Encryption

Cryptography, the science of secret writing,19 is the
means by which parties can safeguard their important
information by preventing unauthorized access. In order to
keep information secret, a party will encrypt it, which is the
method by which a message is rendered undecipherable to
third parties, and in order for the authorized party to read the
15

See infra text accompanying notes 19-20, 24-27.
See infra text accompanying notes 24-27.
17
See Part I.B.
18
See supra note 4.
19
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 439
(Houghton Mifflin Co., 4th ed. 2000) (defining cryptography as “1. The process or skill
of communicating in or deciphering secret writings or ciphers. 2. Secret writing.”).
16
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hidden message, it must be decrypted, which is the method by
which a secret message is turned into regular text.20 Depending
on whether the data is encrypted or decrypted, it is referred to
as “plaintext” or “ciphertext.” Plaintext is the underlying
information that is being encrypted—i.e., the secret message or
document that is meant to be protected.21 Ciphertext is the
product of the encryption—i.e., the undecipherable text in
which the message is hidden.22 Anyone wishing to uncover the
secret message, including governments acting in their criminal
investigatory capacities, will be after the underlying data, i.e.,
the plaintext.23
States and individuals have relied on cryptography to
safeguard critical information and communications throughout
history. A primitive example of the practice, reported by Greek
historian Herodotus, involved the tattooing of a secret message
on the scalp of a slave, allowing the slave’s hair to grow back,
and then sending the slave to the recipient of the message so
that his head could be shaved and the secret message
revealed.24 Julius Caesar employed a slightly more advanced
method of cryptography in ancient Roman times.25 Fearing that
his military communiqués would be intercepted, Caesar
employed the simple cryptographic process of shifting every
letter in the alphabet up three steps, such that a “B” would
become a “E,” and a “P” would become an “S.”26 Since the days
of Herodotus and Julius Caesar, encryption methods have
evolved from simple ciphers, to complex mechanical devices,27
20

Id. at 589 (defining encrypt as “[t]o alter (a file, for example) using a secret
code so as to be unintelligible to unauthorized parties”). Id. at 473 (defining decryption
as “[a] deciphered or decoded message”).
21
Phillip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 172 n.8 (1996) (“‘Plaintext’ is unencrypted or decrypted text;
‘ciphertext’ is encrypted text.”).
22
Id.
23
The government, in attempting to acquire criminal evidence where
encryption has been utilized, will seek to gain either the plaintext, or the encryption
key/password so that they can decipher the ciphertext on their own. Reitinger, supra
note 21, at 175. Regardless, the ultimate aim of the government is to uncover the
underlying data, i.e., the plaintext.
24
HERODOTUS, 3 THE HISTORY OF HERODOTUS 197 (George Rawlinson trans.,
D. Appleton & Co. 1889) (“Thus accordingly he did; and as soon as ever the hair was
grown, he despatched the man to Miletus giving him no other message than this—
‘When thou art come to Miletus, bid Aristagoras shave thy head and look thereon.’”).
25
Adam C. Bonin, Protecting Protection: First and Fifth Amendment
Challenges to Cryptography Regulation, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 497 (1996).
26
Id.
27
See Aaron M. Clemens, No Computer Exception to the Constitution: The
Fifth Amendment Protects Against Compelled Production of an Encrypted Document or
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and finally to digital encryption of electronic data. Today,
electronic encryption has become standard practice for
governments, corporations, and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
individuals.28
B.

Technical Background

Although the basic idea of cryptography is simple, in
fact it can be a quite complex process. As one might suspect, in
today’s digital world, ciphers are no longer created and decoded
simply by tattooing or transcribing letters. Rather, quite
intricate methods are required to encrypt and decrypt
messages.
First, in order to decrypt information that has been
encrypted using modern techniques, an “encryption key” is
needed. An encryption key is essentially a very long string of
numbers whose length makes it extremely hard to memorize.29
Users of encryption software generally do not have to
remember this long number and, instead, can enter a more
easily remembered password or passphrase, which in turn
activates the encryption key.30 Thus, when the government
seeks to compel an ordinary citizen to turn over the means by
which he can decrypt the data, the disclosure order will

Private Key, 8 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 4 n.26 (2004) (describing the German Enigma
machine).
28
See David B. Walker, Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption Policy—A Call
for Congressional Action, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 14 (1999) (“Encryption is
becoming a central fixture in the burgeoning electronic commerce industry.”). See
generally Declan McCullagh, CNET NEWS, Obama’s New BlackBerry: The NSA’s
Secure PDA?, Jan. 13, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/obamas-new-blackberry-the-nsassecure-pda/ (discussing balancing President-Elect Barack Obama’s desire to continue
using his mobile email device with the paramount need to encrypt sensitive data).
29
Anoop MS, Public Key Cryptography: Applications Algorithms and
Mathematical Explanations 2 (2007), available at http://www.tataelxsi.com/
whitepapers/pub_key2.pdf?pdf_id=public_key_TEL.pdf
[hereinafter
Public
Key
Cryptography] (“The public key algorithms operate on sufficiently large numbers to
make [deriving the private key from the public key] practically impossible and thus
make the system secure. For example, RSA algorithm operates on large numbers of
thousands of bits long.”); see also Reitinger, supra note 21, at 174 (“For example, the
widely used Data Encryption Standard (“DES”) algorithm uses a single key fifty-six
bits in length—up to more than 70,000,000,000,000,000 in decimal notation—for both
encryption and decryption. Public-key algorithms use different keys for encryption and
decryption, and much longer keys, such as 512 (and greater) bit numbers—over 150
decimal digits.” (footnote omitted)).
30
Such a password would be similar to the password used to log into an
email account, or the pin number used to access a bank account at an ATM.
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typically compel him to turn over his password rather than the
encryption key.31
There are two methods of using encryption keys—public
key encryption and private key encryption. Historically, most
encryption was accomplished via the private key method. In
the simplest of terms, a private key system involves one key
that is used for both encrypting and decrypting the encoded
message.32 The sender uses a certain key to encrypt the
message, and the receiver uses that same key to decrypt it.33
In 197634 Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman proposed
a new method of encryption: public key encryption.35 In this
system, there are two keys, a public key, which is used for
encryption, and a private key, which is used for decryption.36
The public key is available to the public at large, and the
private key is known only to the person using the encryption.37
Thus, for example, if one wishes to send a secure message
using this type of encryption, he would encrypt the message
using a public key, send it, and then the recipient would
decrypt the message using her private key.38 One hoping to
intercept and decrypt this message would be unable to do so
using only the public key because it is a “computationally
infeasible” task to derive the private key from the public key.39
In other words, the reason it is difficult to break strong
encryption is that while it is a simple task to compute the
public key from the private key, it is extremely difficult to do
the opposite and derive the private key from the public key.40
31

This was the case in Boucher. The government sought to force Mr. Boucher
to turn over his encryption password. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher
(Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No.
2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
32
Wolfe, supra note 5, at 715.
33
Id.
34
Public key encryption was actually invented earlier than 1976 by members
of the British Government Communications Headquarters, but their findings were not
disclosed. Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad: An Historical Perspective on Software
Patents, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 230 (2005).
35
Whitfield Diffie & Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, 12
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 644 (1976).
36
Public Key Cryptography, supra note 29, at 3.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Diffie & Hellman, supra note 35, at 644.
40
Public Key Cryptography, supra note 29, at 1-2. It is a computationally
infeasible task to derive the private key because:
The private and public key of a device is related by the mathematical
function called the one-way function. One-way functions are mathematical
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This is known as a “one-way function” because it is only easily
solvable in one direction.41 The only way to ascertain the
private key in such circumstances is to use a specialized
computer program that guesses, one at a time, the correct
number.42 This process can take an exceptionally long time.43
Thus, it is virtually impossible to break strong public key
encryption without compelling, or otherwise obtaining, access
to the private key.44
II.

THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO COMPELLED KEY
DISCLOSURE

Encryption technology is a double-edged sword and, as
such, can be utilized by criminals to shield evidence from
governments.45 Unlike Great Britain, which has dealt with the
issue statutorily,46 Congress has thus far declined to pass a
statute directly addressing the issue of compelled decryption.47
Thus, the problem has been left to the judiciary, and there it
has been examined under Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.

functions in which the forward operation can be done easily but the reverse
operation is so difficult that it is practically impossible. In public key
cryptography the public key is calculated using private key on the forward
operation of the one-way function. Obtaining of private key from the public
key is a reverse operation. If the reverse operation can be done easily, that is
if the private key is obtained from the public key and other public data, then
the public key algorithm for the particular key is cracked. The reverse
operation gets difficult as the key size increases.
Id.
41

Id.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
43
Id.
44
See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
45
See supra note 6.
46
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act was passed in 2000.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, §§ 49-56.
47
Congress had an opportunity to address the issue of compelled decryption
in the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”). 47 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1010 (2006). The only section that references encryption merely states that
telecommunications providers will not be responsible for decrypting any encrypted
information that happens to moving over its lines. Id. § 1002(b)(3) (“A
telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the
government’s ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or
customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses
the information necessary to decrypt the communication.”). Therefore, unlike its
British counterpart, CALEA does not contain any language compelling individuals to
decrypt their encrypted data. See generally RIPA, 2000, ch. 23 (Eng.).
42
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Fifth Amendment Analysis

The first federal case to directly touch upon the issue of
compelled decryption is In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher,
handed down in the Federal District Court of Vermont on
November 29th, 2007.48 In Boucher, Magistrate Judge Jerome
J. Niedermeier held that the act of being compelled to turn over
an encryption password has testimonial aspects.49 As a result,
the defendant was allowed to refuse to surrender his password
under protection of the Fifth Amendment right to refrain from
testimonial self-incrimination.50 This case forms the basis of the
American approach to compelled decryption under Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence.
Early American legislators were so opposed to the
ancient English system, in which admissions of guilt won
under torture were admissible, that they made the right
against self-incrimination a cornerstone of the Bill of Rights.51
48

See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91,
2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt.
Feb. 19, 2009).
49
Id. at *3.
50
Id. at *3-4. The holding of Boucher was reversed on narrow grounds by the
District Court of Vermont. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher II), No.
2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *3-4 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). Judge William K. Sessions
reversed Judge Niedermeier’s opinion on the grounds that the foregone conclusion
doctrine precluded the use of Fifth Amendment protection. Id. As discussed later, in
being forced to turn over a password, a defendant makes three implicit assertions
which may be incriminating: that the sought after files exist, that they are authentic,
and that the defendant has control over the files. See infra text accompanying notes 6465. When the government is already aware of these three facts, a defendant is not able
to seek refuge in the Fifth Amendment because the incriminating information that
would be produced is a foregone conclusion. See infra text accompanying notes 104-105.
In Boucher, when Sebastien Boucher came over the border, his hard drive
was unencrypted and government agents were able to view the files, thus learning of
the existence of the purported child pornography. Boucher II, 2009 WL 424718, at *3-4.
Further, in admitting that the computer was his, Boucher communicated to the
government that the files were under his control and authentic. Id. at *4. Thus, the
implicit assertions were foregone conclusions, and Judge Sessions ordered Boucher to
comply with the order. Id.
This reversal does not alter the fundamental analysis presented here. It is
easy to imagine a situation where the existence, authenticity, and control over a file or
files were not a foregone conclusion. For example, the government could raid the
headquarters of a criminal enterprise and find several encrypted hard drives. Because
the hard drives were encrypted and the government never had initial access, a
defendant ordered to turn over the password to these hard drives could potentially
refuse to comply under the Fifth Amendment because the foregone conclusion doctrine
would not apply.
51
See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896) (“So deeply did the
iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American
colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an
accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England
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The Fifth Amendment states, “No person shall . . . be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”52 This
right against self-incrimination is not, however, absolute. In
order for Fifth Amendment protection to attach, three
prerequisites must be met: (1) the disclosure must be
testimonial,53 (2) the disclosure must be compelled,54 and (3) it
must be possible that criminal liability could result.55 In the
vast majority of criminal cases where the government is
seeking an encryption key or password, that disclosure is being
compelled and criminal liability could result, thus typically
leaving only the question of whether disclosing the encryption
key is testimonial in nature.56
A communication is considered testimonial when it
“explicitly or implicitly, relate[s] a factual assertion or
disclose[s] information.”57 Conversely, the Supreme Court has
held that a communication is non-testimonial when the suspect
is “not required ‘to disclose any knowledge he might have,’ or

was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of
a constitutional enactment.”).
52
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“Fifth Amendment . . .
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that
is incriminating.” (second emphasis added)).
54
Id. at 409 (“A subpoena served on a [person] requiring him to produce
[documents] in his possession without doubt involves substantial compulsion.”); see
also Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (“Subpoenas require compliance and therefore
constitute compulsion.”).
55
Generally, Fifth Amendment protection does not attach unless there is the
possibility that criminal sanctions could result. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408 (“Fifth
Amendment . . . applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial
communication that is incriminating.”). Hence, if a suspect is granted complete
immunity, he cannot seek refuge in the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Rose, 806
F.2d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The federal grant of use immunity is sufficient to
overcome the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”). More
specifically, as a matter of common sense, encrypted information being sought by the
government in its investigative capacity will likely be incriminating. In Boucher, the
judge noted, “Because the files sought by the government allegedly contain child
pornography, the entry of the password would be incriminating.” Boucher I, 2007 WL
4246473, at *2.
56
See Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2. Generally, the plaintext which is
hidden by the encryption would not be protected by the Fifth Amendment, because in
most cases such plaintext would be voluntarily prepared, and thus would not be a
testimonial statement afforded protection under the Fifth Amendment. Reitinger,
supra note 21, at 178 (“[I]f law enforcement subpoenas information that I have
encrypted, I must produce the information in plaintext if it remains available to me in
that form, assuming I have no other proper objection, such as my privilege against selfincrimination”).
57
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
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‘to speak his guilt.’”58 There are a number of compelled
disclosures that are non-testimonial and thus do not violate the
Fifth Amendment, including taking blood samples, taking
fingerprints, taking voice and handwriting exemplars,
compelling someone to wear particular clothing, and forcing
someone to stand in a lineup.59
Typically, the contents of a document or hard drive will
not be protected by the Fifth Amendment.60 Nevertheless, in
certain circumstances the very act of turning over a document
or providing a password to an encrypted hard drive will
implicitly communicate incriminating facts and hence will be
protected.61 In Fisher v. United States, the government sought
to compel the production of certain incriminating documents,
and the defendant refused to comply on the grounds that the
act of producing the documents would constitute selfincrimination.62 Although the documents themselves were
voluntarily prepared and were therefore not protected, the
defendants argued that the act of production implicitly
asserted incriminating facts and should be protected by the
Fifth Amendment.63 Justice White’s majority opinion for the
Supreme Court held that complying with a subpoena to
produce documents could implicitly communicate three facts:
that the documents exist,64 that they are in the control of the
accused, and that the papers are authentic.65 This is sometimes
referred to as the “act of production doctrine.”66 Applying this
58

Id. at 210 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967); see
also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (“[T]he prohibition of compelling a man
in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body
as evidence when it may be material.”).
59
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. at 210.
60
Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2.
61
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984).
62
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-12 (1976).
63
Id. at 410-11.
64
The first element, that the documents actually exist, is interesting with
regard to encryption software programs, such as TrueCrypt, which specifically market
the ability to hide even the fact that the encrypted files even exist within the
ciphertext. TrueCrypt, Plausible Deniability, Hidden Volume, http://www.truecrypt.
org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
65
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (“Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes
the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer.
It also would indicate the taxpayer’s belief that the papers are those described in the
subpoena.”); see also Clemens, supra note 27, at 11-12 (discussing the application of the
three Fisher prongs to encryption key disclosure).
66
See Reitinger, supra note 21, at 180. Notably, turning over an encryption
password would not be explicitly incriminating, unless the password itself

356

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1

doctrine to compelled decryption, it can be argued that being
forced to turn over a password would implicitly communicate
that the electronic files that the government is seeking exist,
that the defendant actually has control over and access to the
files, and that the electronic files are authentic. This is the
defense that Sebastien Boucher raised when the government
attempted to compel him to turn over his password in
Boucher.67
Nevertheless, the government may be able to draft a
subpoena compelling disclosure in a manner such that the
testimonial aspects of the act of production are not implicated.
In such circumstances, the protection against self
incrimination would not attach and the defendant would be left
no recourse save compliance. This was the case in Doe v.
United States.68 There, the government subpoenaed bank
records for several accounts in the Cayman Islands and
Bermuda.69 The unnamed defendant failed to respond to the
subpoena, and so the government attempted to force the
defendant to sign a number of release forms that would allow
the banks to turn over the records.70 The defendant claimed
Fifth Amendment protection.71 The Supreme Court held that
the forms the defendant was asked to sign spoke only in the
hypothetical, and, that because of the non-specific way in which
they were drafted, signing them did not acknowledge the
existence of, or control over, any account, or communicate the
authenticity of any records.72 Thus, the three implicit assertions
about which the Fisher Court was concerned were not
implicated, and the defendant was not entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection.

communicated some incriminating fact, for example, if, in a child pornography case, the
password was “iluvyoungkidz.”
67
In re Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *3 (D. Vt.
Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
68
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 218 (1988).
69
Id. at 202-03.
70
Id. at 203.
71
Id. at 203-04.
72
Id. at 215-16 (“It is carefully drafted not to make reference to a specific
account, but only to speak in the hypothetical. Thus, the form does not acknowledge
that an account in a foreign financial institution is in existence or that it is controlled
by petitioner. . . . Nor would his execution of the form admit the authenticity of any
records produced by the bank.”).
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In re Boucher

Boucher is the first case to apply this Fifth Amendment
logic to the issue of compelled decryption. On December 17,
2006, while crossing the border from Canada into the United
States at the town of Derby Line, Vermont, Sebastian
Boucher’s car was pulled over and inspected by Customs and
Border Protection agent Chris Pike.73 While performing the
inspection, Officer Pike noticed a laptop in the back seat,
opened it, and was able to access the hard drive without
entering a password.74 After investigating the computer’s
contents, Officer Pike located approximately 40,000 images,
some of which appeared to be pornographic.75 When asked if
any of the images contained child pornography, Boucher
responded that he was not sure.76 After discovering several file
names that appeared to reference child pornography, Officer
Pike called in Special Agent Mark Curtis of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.77 During the course of his investigation,
Agent Curtis found a file, entitled “2yo getting raped during
diaper change.”78 Although Agent Curtis could tell that the file
had been recently opened, he was unable to open it at that
time.79
Boucher was then arrested and subsequently waived his
Miranda rights.80 When asked about the aforementioned file,

73

In re Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *1 (D. Vt.
Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
74
Id. A reason that the officer may not have had to enter a password is that
with most encryption software, when you simply close your laptop, thereby putting it to
“sleep,” instead of actually shutting it down, the encrypted drive will remain accessible
without
re-entering
the
password
(“mounted”).
See
TrueCrypt,
FAQ,
http://www.truecrypt.org/faq.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2009) (“TrueCrypt automatically
dismounts all mounted TrueCrypt volumes on system shutdown/restart.”). Once the
computer is shut down, the encrypted drive is dismounted and cannot be accessed
again without entering the password. Id.
75
Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *1.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. The purpose of Miranda rights is to counteract the inherently coercive
nature of custodial interrogation and protect the privilege against self incrimination.
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). “[T]he [suspect] must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed.” Id. Here, Boucher waived his Miranda rights so the
police were allowed to interrogate him without counsel present. Boucher I, 2007 WL
4246473, at *1. However, the Fifth Amendment can be invoked at anytime, so even
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Boucher said that, because he downloaded many pornographic
images, sometimes he would “unknowingly” download child
pornography.81 When he discovered the child pornography,
Boucher claimed he would immediately delete the images.82
Boucher then showed Agent Curtis the drive (“drive Z”) on
which he downloaded the pornography, and Agent Curtis
discovered several “images and videos of child pornography in
drive Z.”83 The laptop was shut down and seized.84
On December 29, 2006, Mike Touchette of the Vermont
Department of Corrections restarted Boucher’s computer, and
made a mirror image copy of its hard drive.85 However,
Touchette was then unable to access drive Z because it had
been encrypted using a software program named Pretty Good
Privacy (“PGP”).86 In fact, because of this encryption, the
government has not been able to view any of the files on drive Z
since December 17, 2006, the day the laptop was seized.87 In an
attempt to gain access to the files, the government obtained a
grand jury subpoena for the production of “all documents,
whether in electronic or paper form, reflecting any passwords
used or associated with the Alienware Notebook Computer . . .
seized from Sebastien Boucher at the Port of Entry at Derby
Line, Vermont on December 17, 2006.”88 Boucher motioned to
quash the subpoena, claiming that the act of turning over the
password violated his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.89
In addressing the motion, Judge Niedermeier began his
analysis with the conclusion that, because the subpoena sought
to compel Boucher to enter his key for the purposes of
subjecting Boucher to criminal liability, the self-incrimination
issue turned entirely on whether this act was testimonial in
nature.90 He determined that entering the password “implicitly

though Boucher initially waived his rights, he is permitted to subsequently claim them
at any later time. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
81
Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *1.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See supra Part I.B.
88
Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (emphasis added).
89
Id. See generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
90
See Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (“Because the files sought by the
government allegedly contain child pornography, the entry of the password would be
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communicates facts,” and that if Boucher was forced to comply,
he would “be faced with the forbidden trilemma; incriminate
himself, lie under oath, or find himself in contempt of court.”91
Judge Niedermeier rejected the government’s argument that,
like signing the non-specific release forms at issue in Doe, the
act of entering the password was non-testimonial.92 He
distinguished the two cases on the grounds that, in Doe, the
Court found that no implicit facts would be communicated due
to the artful drafting of the release form, whereas in the
present case, entering the password would implicitly
communicate that Mr. Boucher had access to the files.93
According to Judge Niedermeier, in Doe, “the suspect was
compelled to act to obtain access without indicating that he
believed himself to have access. Here, when Boucher enters a
password he indicates that he believes he has access.”94
In an attempt to avoid a Fifth Amendment challenge,
the government offered immunity specifically with regards to
the act of producing the password, as opposed to immunity for
any child pornography charge.95 The government argued that a
grant of immunity would permit compelled disclosure because
the Fifth Amendment does not protect communications for
which no criminal liability could result.96 The Supreme Court
passed on a similar government tactic in United States v.
Hubbell.97 There, the government subpoenaed documents from
the defendant, and they were supplied after immunity was
granted solely for the act of production.98 After the defendant
turned over the documents, the government sought to use them
against him in an unrelated tax case.99 The Supreme Court
incriminating. Whether the privilege against self incrimination applies therefore
depends on whether the subpoena seeks testimonial communication.”).
91
Id. at *3 (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988)).
92
Id.
93
See id. at *4.
94
Id.
95
Id. The government was attempting to only grant use, and not derivative
use, immunity. A grant of both “use” and “derivative use” immunity prevents the
government from using a particular piece of the suspect’s testimony against him, and
from using any evidence which is derived only from that particular testimony. 22 C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 98 (2009). In any event, use or derivative use immunity “is not full
immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates,
[as it] allows . . . a prosecution using evidence from legitimate independent sources.” Id.
(citations and footnotes omitted).
96
See Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *4.
97
530 U.S. 27 (2000).
98
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 31 (2000).
99
Id. at 31-32.
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rejected this tactic, holding that the grant of immunity for the
production of the documents included immunity for any
information that was derived from that act of production.100
Similarly, in Boucher, “the government offered not to
use the production of the password against Boucher,” and thus,
in their eyes, “remove[d] the testimonial aspect from the”
disclosure.101 Judge Niedermeier disagreed and, relying on
Hubbell, stated that the “testimonial aspect of the entry of the
password precludes the use of the files themselves as derivative
of the compelled testimony.”102 Thus, Judge Niedermeier
concluded that the government’s offer of immunity for the act
of production was unavailing because obtaining the plaintext
would be a derivative use of the compelled act.103 Under the
court’s reasoning, immunizing a person solely for the act of
typing in his encryption password would prevent the
government from using the derivatively acquired plaintext in a
criminal trial against him.
The government also argued that it should have access
to the files under the “foregone conclusion” doctrine.104 Under
this doctrine, if the government is already aware of the
existence and location of a particular document or file, and if
producing the document or file would not “implicitly
authenticate” it, then any evidence gained would be a foregone
conclusion, and the suspect would not be entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection.105 Simply restated, if the act of
production would not implicitly communicate the three Fisher
elements because the government already could prove each of
them, then the three assertions would be a foregone conclusion
and Fifth Amendment protection would not attach. In Boucher,
the government argued that because its agents were able to
access drive Z and view child pornography before the computer
was shutdown, it already knew the location and existence of at
least some child pornography on Boucher’s laptop and, thus,
the foregone conclusion doctrine applied.106
100

Id. at 40.
Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *4.
102
Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
103
Id.
104
Id. at *5-6. This is the argument Judge Sessions seized upon in reversing
Boucher I. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
105
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d
87, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1983)).
106
See Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *5-6.
101
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Judge Niedermeier disagreed. With regard to turning
over the files, he wrote that the government only knew the
location of a couple of files, and that there was a lot of
information on drive Z about which the government had no
knowledge.107 Because “the files the government has not seen
could add much to the sum total of the government’s
information,” Judge Niedermeier held that “the foregone
conclusion doctrine [did] not apply.”108 With regard to solely
turning over the password, Judge Niedermeier argued that
“[t]he foregone conclusion doctrine does not apply to the
production of non-physical evidence, existing only in a suspect’s
mind where the act of production can be used against him.”109
In reversing Judge Niedermeier’s holding, Judge
Sessions seized upon the foregone conclusion doctrine and held
that, because government agents were able to view the files
before they were encrypted, and because Boucher admitted the
laptop was his, the foregone conclusion doctrine did, in fact,
apply.110 Thus, Boucher was directed to comply with the order
and turn over an unencrypted version of the Z drive.111
Regardless, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which the
foregone conclusion would not apply. For example, if agents
seized an encrypted computer, but they were not sure if it
belonged to a particular suspect, they would never have had
access to the encrypted files, and they could not prove it was
under the suspect’s control. In such a situation, it is likely that
the foregone conclusion doctrine would not apply, and a
defendant could seek refuge in the Fifth Amendment.
Ultimately, Judge Niedermeier’s opinion in Boucher
exemplifies the American approach to the dilemma posed by
powerful encryption: the idea that compelled password
disclosure can have Fisher-like testimonial aspects, and thus
Fifth Amendment protection can, in certain circumstances, be
invoked to avoid compliance with a governmental order to turn
over a password.

107

Id. at *6.
Id.
109
Id.
110
In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher II), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009
WL 424718, at *3-4 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); see also supra note 50 and accompanying
text. At least one commentator presaged this holding. See Posting of Orin Kerr to The
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com (Dec. 19, 2007, 16:38).
111
Boucher II, 2009 WL 424718, at *4.
108
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THE BRITISH APPROACH TO COMPELLED KEY
DISCLOSURE

Great Britain is one of the most heavily surveilled
countries on the planet.112 In 2006, there were an estimated 4.2
million closed circuit televisions in Britain, meaning there was
roughly one surveillance camera for every fourteen people.113 In
light of the this, it is not surprising that, contrary to the
American legislative avoidance of the issue, Great Britain
enacted a statute which expressly permits the government to
compel decryption.114 This statute, the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act (“RIPA”), empowers certain
governmental actors, like the judiciary, high-level police,
customs and excise officials, and military officers to compel
decryption by threat of imprisonment and fines for
noncompliance.115
A.

Background of RIPA

As a member of the Council of Europe,116 the United
Kingdom and its laws are subject to the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”).117 In 1997, the
ECHR held that Britain’s then-applicable law on the
interception of communications violated the European Human
Rights Convention because it did not address “interceptions
carried out over private communication networks.”118 In
response, Great Britain passed the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act (“RIPA”).119 RIPA was designed not only to comply
with the ECHR decision, but also to address the rapid growth
112

See Britain is ‘Surveillance Society,’ BBC NEWS, Nov. 2, 2006, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6108496.stm.
113
Id.
114
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, ch. 23 (Eng.).
115
Id.
116
Tarik Abdel-Monem, Precedent of the European Convention on Human
Rights to the CIA’s High Value Detainees Program in and Through Europe, 31 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 45, 52 n.38 (2007).
117
European Court of Human Rights, How the Execution of Judgment Works,
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/Execution/How+the+execution+o
f+judgments+wo-rks/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2009) (“The [parties] to the European
Convention on Human Rights have committed themselves to secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention and, in
this respect, have undertaken to ‘abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case
to which they are parties.’”).
118
Yeates, supra note 10, at 133.
119
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23.
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of communications technology and the fervent desire of
government officials to ensure that police agencies were able to
keep up with this shifting landscape.120
The preamble of RIPA identifies the purposes of the Act,
and specifically singles out encryption as a primary focus:
An Act to make provision for and about the interception of
communications, the acquisition and disclosure of data relating to
communications, the carrying out of surveillance, the use of covert
human intelligence sources and the acquisition of the means by
which electronic data protected by encryption or passwords may be
decrypted or accessed . . . .121

RIPA was passed by Parliament in 2000, and Part III of
the Act, which addresses forced decryption, was put into effect
in October of 2007.122
B.

RIPA
1. Section 49

Part III of RIPA is entitled “Investigation of Electronic
Data Protected by Encryption etc.”123 The statute lays out
several important definitions. First, it defines a key as “any
key, code, password, algorithm or other data the use of which
(with or without other keys) . . . (a) allows access to the
electronic data, or (b) facilitates the putting of the data into an
intelligible form.”124 Protected information is “any electronic
data which, without the key to the data . . . (a) cannot, or
cannot readily, be accessed, or (b) cannot, or cannot readily, be
put into an intelligible form.”125 Lastly, rendering a document
into intelligible form requires putting the document “in the
condition in which it was before an encryption or similar
process was applied to it.”126
Section 49 of Part III governs the conditions under
which the British government is permitted to compel citizens to
120

Yeates, supra note 10, at 134-38 (discussing in more depth the
technological changes that led to the passage of both CALEA and the RIPA).
121
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, §§ 49-56 (emphasis added).
122
Jeremy Kirk, Contested UK Encryption Disclosure Law Takes Effect,
WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/10/01/AR2007100100511.html.
123
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, §§ 49-56.
124
Id. § 56(1).
125
Id.
126
Id. § 56(3).
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turn over the plaintext of the requested encrypted documents.127
Accordingly, the orders which the government employs to
compel disclosure are known as “Section 49 Notices.”128 Notably,
turning over the plaintext of an encrypted document is
tantamount to divulging the encryption password because, if
one is being forced to turn over the plaintext, one must enter
the password against his will.129
Section 49 first requires that the ciphertext be obtained
in a lawful manner.130 There are several enumerated examples
of how this can be done.131 The two most prominent are when
information has come into a government agent’s possession
either by “means of the exercise of a statutory power to seize,
detain, inspect, search,” or “by means of the exercise of any
statutory power to intercept communications.”132 This includes
the common situation in which information is seized pursuant
to a judicial warrant.133 The requirement to obtain the
ciphertext in a lawful manner is important because it means
that the British government is not permitted to compel
decryption unless it has obtained possession of the encrypted
information lawfully.134 For example, if a police officer seized a
computer without a valid warrant, the government would not
have lawful possession of that computer, and thus could not
compel plaintext disclosure.
In the ordinary case, a law enforcement agency will
receive permission to issue a Section 49 notice from an official
with the appropriate authorization, then serve the notice upon
the target of the investigation. The recipient, in turn, must

127

Id. § 49.
See Home Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, Encryption,
Disclosure of Keys, http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/encryption/disclosure-of-keys/
(last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
129
Additionally, there is a section in Part III which empowers the government
to require that the key itself be turned over. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act,
ch. 23, § 51. The British government is more reluctant to compel disclosure of the
actual key when the plaintext will suffice so it adds several extra burdens that must be
met in order compel key disclosure as compared to plaintext disclosure. See
Explanatory Notes to Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ¶ 272 (2000) [hereinafter
Explanatory Notes].
130
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 49(1); see also
Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 256.
131
Id.
132
Id. § 49(1)(a)-(b).
133
Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 256.
134
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 49(1)(a)-(e).
128
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hand over the requested plaintext within a reasonable amount
of time.135 Failure to comply is a crime.136
Subsection (2) of Section 49 places certain limiting
factors on the ability of the government to compel decryption,
and also references Schedule 2, which describes the
governmental actors that have the authority to compel
decryption.137 First, the key must be in the possession of the
person on whom the notice is being served.138 Second, decryption
can be compelled only if there is a specifically enumerated
justification for doing so139 (the acceptable justifications are
delineated in subsection (3), discussed in the next paragraph).140
Third, the “imposition of such [compelled disclosure must be]
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by its
imposition.”141 Thus, the statute implements a balancing test in
which the governmental interest in obtaining the plaintext
must be equal to or greater than the interests of the individual
seeking to prevent compelled decryption. Finally, it must not be
“reasonably practicable” for the government agent to obtain the
plaintext without such compulsion.142 Thus, for example, if the
encryption is very weak and could be easily deciphered, or if
the password is written down on a piece of paper whose
location is known to the police, compelled decryption would not
be appropriate because it would be reasonable to acquire the
plaintext by other means.143 This has the effect of making
compelled disclosure a last resort.
Subsection (3) of Section 49 delineates the three specific
justifications for compelled key disclosure.144 Under this
subsection, plaintext disclosure can be compelled only “in the
interests of national security,” “for the purpose of preventing or
detecting crime,” or “in the interests of the economic well-being
of the United Kingdom.”145

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

See Home Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, supra note 128.
Id.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 49(2).
Id. § 49(2)(a); see also Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 257.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 49(2)(b).
Id. § 49(3).
Id. § 49(2)(c).
Id. § 49(2)(d).
See id.
Id. § 49(3).
Id.
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2. Schedule 2
Schedule 2 of RIPA addresses who is allowed to
authorize compelled disclosure. First, in order to compel
plaintext disclosure, one must have appropriate written
permission from a judge, unless one of the statutory exceptions
applies.146 These exceptions are laid out in Paragraphs 2
through 5 of Schedule 2, which also discuss the level of
authority required to grant permission to force plaintext
disclosure. Importantly, the level of authority “varies
depending on the powers under which [the] unintelligible
information . . . is likely to be obtained.”147 As a result, the
statute allows for non-judicial governmental actors to authorize
compelled decryption.
Under Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 (“Data obtained under
a warrant etc”), a government officer may serve a notice
compelling plaintext disclosure if he or she obtained
unintelligible information pursuant to a warrant issued by “the
Secretary of State or a person holding judicial office,”148 so long
as the officer was given authorization to do so either in the
warrant itself, or subsequently.149 Paragraph 2 specifically
excludes from compelled disclosure any encrypted information
that was seized without a warrant.150
Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 (“Data obtained
by the intelligence services under statute but without a
warrant”), where an intelligence service comes into possession
of unintelligible information151 in the course of lawful
surveillance but without a warrant, the intelligence service can
issue a notice compelling disclosure of the plaintext if it has
written permission from the Secretary of State.152 In these
instances, there is no requirement of prior judicial approval.
Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 (“Data obtained under
statute by other persons but without a warrant”) covers
situations when a government agency other than the
intelligence services comes into the possession of encrypted
information which was not obtained pursuant to a warrant, but
146

Id. sched. 2, ¶ 1(1).
Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 357.
148
Id. at ¶ 360.
149
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, sched. 2, ¶ 2(2).
150
Id. ¶ 2(9).
151
Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 366. Unintelligible information
refers to encrypted data.
152
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, sched. 2, ¶ 3(2).
147
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was acquired legally pursuant to statutory power.153 In such
situations, the high ranking members of these agencies154 may
grant permission to compel plaintext disclosure.155 To compel
disclosure, a police officer must be of at least the rank of
superintendent to give such permission, with some
exceptions.156 With regard to Customs and Excise, the official
must be the Commissioner of Customs and Excise, or above a
lesser rank set by the Commissioner.157 Finally, for the military,
the officer must be above the rank of lieutenant colonel, or
above a rank set by a lieutenant colonel.158
Similarly, Paragraph 5 (“Data obtained without the
exercise of statutory powers”) grants the aforementioned
officials the power to authorize compelled disclosure where the
encrypted information has come into the hands of the police,
Customs and Excise, or an intelligence service lawfully, but not
via their respective statutory powers—i.e., if it was voluntarily
handed over.159 Thus, when encrypted information is seized
pursuant to the statutory power of one of the enumerated
agencies, there is no requirement of judicial oversight for
compelled disclosure.
3. Section 50
Section 50 discusses some of the formalities that
accompany receiving a Section 49 notice. Under this section,
recipients of an order to compel disclosure are given the option
to turn over the encryption key instead of the requested
plaintext.160 Moreover, Subsection (8) of Section 50 requires a
person no longer in possession of the key to provide information
that could help law enforcement gain possession of it.161
153

Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 368.
The agencies are the police, Customs and Excise, and the military. Id. ¶ 369.
155
Id.
156
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, sched. 2, ¶ 6(3) (concerning
information that has come into the police’s hands through the exercise of power of
section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 or section 13A or 13B of the Prevention of
Terrorism Act of 1989).
157
Id. ¶ 6(4).
158
Id. ¶ 6(5).
159
Id. ¶ 5; see also Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 371.
160
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 50(1)-(2) (“A person
subject to a requirement [of disclosing plaintext] . . . shall be taken to have complied
with that requirement if . . . he makes, instead, a disclosure of any key to the protected
information that is in his possession.” (emphasis added)).
161
Id. § 50(8).
154
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4. Section 51
Section 51 addresses the situation where the
government specifically wants the encryption key, instead of
merely the plaintext.162 In such a case, Section 51 requires that
the government satisfy several extra burdens.163 First, a
government official may only require disclosure of the actual
key when “special circumstances” exist such that the purpose of
the disclosure, to get the plaintext, would be defeated without
obtaining the actual key.164 Second, the official must balance the
imposition of compelling the disclosure of the key against two
factors: (1) the risk that other private information, not
including that which the government is specifically seeking,
may be turned over; and (2) the risk that compelled disclosure
might have an adverse effect on the business of the person
being compelled.165
5. Section 53
In Section 53, RIPA criminalizes failure to comply with
these disclosure requirements166: it is a crime to “knowingly
fail[] . . . to make the disclosure required” by a Section 49
notice.167 The punishment resulting from a conviction is up to
two years imprisonment, a fine, or both.168
There are several affirmative defenses to this crime.
First, an individual who fails to comply with a Section 49 notice
can demonstrate that he could not have complied with the
disclosure requirement in the time required, and that he did
comply as soon as it was reasonable to do so.169 Second, an
individual can argue that he was not actually in possession of
the key.170 If an individual is able to raise an issue of fact with
regard to this second defense, the burden then shifts to the
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he does
indeed have possession of the key.171 Thus, the government can
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id. § 51.
Id.
Id. § 51(4).
Id. § 51(5)(b).
Id. § 53-54.
Id. § 53(1).
Id. § 53(5)(a).
Id. § 53(4); see also Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 283.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 53(3).
Id. § 53(3)(b).
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only prosecute under Section 53 if it has successfully proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is in possession of
the encryption key.172
6. Section 54
Under Section 54, RIPA also criminalizes “tipping off.”173
This refers to the notion that, in some situations, a Section 49
notice will include a requirement that the recipient of the
notice keep its delivery and its contents secret.174 A Section 49
notice may contain such a secrecy requirement only when the
encrypted information has come into the possession of the
police “by means which it is reasonable, in order to maintain
the effectiveness of any investigation . . . , or in the interests of
the safety or well-being of any person, to keep secret from a
particular person.”175 Therefore, where the authorities can
articulate a reason why their investigation would be hampered
by disclosing the fact that they had served a Section 49 notice,
they can include what amounts to a gag order.176 When the
recipient of such a Section 49 notice “tips off” another person to
the fact that he received the notice, or discloses the contents of
the notice to another person, he can be subject to criminal
liability.177 A person convicted of this “tipping off” offense will be
subject to “imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or
to a fine, or to both.”178
Section 54 also includes a number of affirmative
defenses. These include: when the tipping off was the result of
software which automatically informed other people that the
encryption key was compromised,179 when the disclosure is
made to legal counsel in a conversation about one’s options
under Part III of RIPA,180 when the disclosure is made to
persons within an organization so that they can comply with

172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id. § 53.
Id. § 54 (Eng.); see also Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 285.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 54(1).
Id. § 54(3).
Id.
Id. § 54(4).
Id. § 54(4)(a).
Id. § 54(5).
Id. § 54(6)-(7).
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the notice,181 and when a person is told about a notice but does
not know that there was a secrecy requirement.182
In contrast to the prospective American system, officers
of the British government are thus empowered to compel
decryption without so much as prior approval of a member of
the judiciary. This system lends a powerful tool in the
burgeoning war against modern criminals.
IV.

CRITICISMS AND A MIDDLE GROUND

America and Great Britain have approached the
dilemma posed by powerful encryption in vastly different
manners. Each resides at one end of a continuum between
providing adequate protection of civil rights and ensuring the
effectiveness of law enforcement. The American approach
favors the protection of civil liberties, while the British
approach favors law enforcement interests. Ultimately though,
each method is fraught with unique problems. Accordingly,
America should seek to adopt a suitable middle ground that
draws upon the strengths, and avoids the weaknesses, of both
approaches.
A.

Criticisms of the American and British Approaches

The major problem with the American approach, as
exemplified by Boucher, is that the government’s power to
investigate and prosecute crimes, especially those of a
technological nature, will be significantly hampered if
criminals are able to hide their activities behind a virtually
unbreakable wall of encryption.183 It is easy to imagine
nightmare scenarios in which law enforcement efforts are
thwarted by criminals utilizing powerful encryption. In her
testimony before the House of Representatives, then U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno described three such hypothetical
situations: terrorists seeking to detonate a bomb in a major city
using encrypted communications, a child abuser and
distributor of child pornography encrypting photographs so as
to hide them from law enforcement, and a computer hacker
stealing personal financial data and then encrypting his hard

181
182
183

Id. § 54(9).
Id. § 54(10).
See supra text accompanying note 5.
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drive so as to avoid detection and prosecution.184 In each of
these scenarios, the consequences to the public would be dire if
the government were unable to access the information it
needed.
The principal problem with the American approach is
that, in the face of widespread encryption, the government
might be severely hindered in its efforts to investigate and
prosecute criminal activity. Despite the notion that there are
some testimonial aspects implicated in forced decryption,
affording sweeping Fifth Amendment protection to such actions
would be impractical because of the possibility that
prosecutions could grind to a halt as a result of widespread
encryption. Moreover, leaving the issue solely to the judiciary
might create uncertainty because the rules pertaining to
compelled decryption could develop in different fashions and at
different paces in the various jurisdictions confronting the
issue. This would be detrimental as legitimate users of
encryption, such as travelling businesspersons would be forced
to alter their data protection strategies depending on in which
jurisdiction they were located.
The British approach, while accounting for the law
enforcement related problems of the American approach, is
fraught with problems of its own. Most fundamentally, in an
attempt to prevent criminals from being able to hide their
activities behind a wall of encryption, RIPA does not provide
adequate provisions for the protection of civil liberties.185
Ultimately, there is very little in the way of safeguards
standing between the government and the encrypted files it
seeks. For example, it is not even always necessary to gain
judicial approval before a Section 49 notice is sent, as
frequently the approval of a high ranking police, Customs and
Excise, or military official will suffice.186 According to one
commentator, RIPA is a “sledgehammer law designed to
184

Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R.
850 Before the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Janet Reno,
Att’y
Gen.
of
the
United
States),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony
/1999/agarmed071399.htm.
185
See Police Decryption Powers Flawed, BBC NEWS, Aug. 15, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4794383.stm; RIPA Could Be Challenged on
Human Rights, OUT-LAW.COM, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.out-law.com//default.aspx?
page=8826.
186
Kirk, supra note 122 (“A Section 49 request must . . . be approved by a
judicial authority, chief of police, the customs and excise commissioner or a person
ranking higher than a brigadier or equivalent.”); supra Part III.B.2.
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support security services at the expense of civil liberties which
are taken for granted in most of the western world.”187 This
commentator continues that “Britain does not join the best
company with [RIPA]—other places to have similar laws
include Russia and Malaysia.”188
A further problem with the British approach is the
inclusion of the gag order provision. Such orders are
reminiscent of the unsuccessful National Security Letters
(“NSLs”) which were authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act.189
NSLs are administrative subpoenas issued by certain
governmental agencies which require no probable cause or
judicial oversight.190 They also contained a gag order provision
similar to Section 54 of RIPA, which forbids the recipient of the
NSL from disclosing to anyone that he received it.191 The gag
order provision was held unconstitutional by a judge in the
Southern District of New York as violative of the First
Amendment.192 The statute was partially amended by Congress
in response to this decision and still it was held
unconstitutional by the same district judge on remand from the
Second Circuit.193 There was also massive popular outcry in
America against the NSL gag orders on civil rights grounds.194
Considering the controversy surrounding the NSL gag orders,
one could imagine that an analogous gag order section in a
potential American compelled decryption statute would be met
with similar dissent.
RIPA has also faced stiff criticism from those who fear it
will hurt e-commerce in Great Britain. Their concern is that
RIPA will drive technology-centered companies out of Great
Britain and into countries with more legal protections for
187

Nick McIntosh, Curbing our Right to Online Freedom, GUARDIAN, Apr. 18,
2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2001/apr/18/news.childprotection/.
188
Id.
189
Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom., Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 86, 864 (2d. Cir. 2008).
190
Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Frequently Asked Questions:
National Security Letters, available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/
nsl_faqs030907.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2009).
191
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006).
192
Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 526-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
193
Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 425-26.
194
See generally Op-Ed, My National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST,
Mar. 23, 2007, at A17; Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Urges
Court to Rule National Security Letters Unconstitutional, Mar. 20, 2008,
http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/03/20; Challenge to the “National Security
Letter” Authority, ACLU, available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/patriot/17458res
20040929.html (last visited June 13, 2009).
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encryption.195 In fact, after the passage of RIPA, Ireland passed
a law which specifically made it clear that the Irish
government would not be permitted to compel key disclosure.196
An independent report prepared for the British Chambers of
Commerce on the economic impact of RIPA stated:
As it stands, RIP[A] is likely to create a legal environment which will
inhibit investment, impede the evolution of e-commerce, impose
direct and indirect costs on business and the consumer, diminish
overall trust in e-commerce, disrupt business-to-business
relationships, place UK companies at a competitive disadvantage,
and create a range of legal uncertainties that will place a growing
number of businesses in a precarious position.197

Critics have also criticized the criticized the perverse
incentives and harsh operation of the statute. They stress that
the purported principal targets of Part III—terrorists and
purveyors of child pornography—would likely take the two or
five year sentence resulting from nondisclosure rather than
face what would assuredly be a much longer sentence if the
data was decrypted and their crimes were revealed.198 Further,
critics argue that a person served with a Section 49 notice
could legitimately have forgotten the requested encryption key,
and could be subject to a two year sentence for nothing more
than absentmindedness.199
Lastly, a structural problem with RIPA is that there are
software programs which foresee the possibility that one could
195

See Yeates, supra note 10, at 153 (“Substantial apprehension exists in
Britain as to whether the RIPA will blunt the growing U.K. e-economy . . . .
[N]umerous critics bitterly pointed out the contrast between Prime Minister Tony
Blair’s stated desire to make the U.K. the friendliest place in the world for e-commerce
and the perceived negative impact of the RIPA on e-commerce.”); see also Victor
Keegan, Op-Ed, Internet Monitoring ‘Time Bomb’ for E-commerce, THE GUARDIAN, June
13,
2000,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2000/jun/13/freespeech.internet
(“[RIPA] will produce one of the most draconian regimes in the world driving ecommerce to safer havens like Ireland and most countries in Europe.”).
196
See Yeates, supra note 10, at 153. The Irish Electric Commerce Bill states,
“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring the disclosure or enabling the
seizure of unique data, such as codes, passwords, algorithms, private cryptographic
keys, or other data, that may be necessary to render information or an electronic
communication intelligible.” Electronic Commerce Act, 2000 (Act No. 27/2000) § 28 (Ir.)
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2000/en/act/pub/0027/sec0028.html.
197
BRITISH CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE
REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL (2000).
198
Julian Glover & Patrick Barkham, The RIP Act, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24,
2000, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/oct/24/qanda (“[D]rug
smugglers and paedophiles [sic] would happily settle for a two-year prison sentence
rather than face far harsher penalties for being found guilty of the crime they are
suspected of.”).
199
Id.
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be forced to turn over a password and plan for this eventuality
by allowing one to create a false “secret” location that is
accessed by a dummy password. TrueCrypt, one such
encryption software program, has a function which allows a
user to set up a section of the encrypted portion of a hard drive
that contains some files, but not the ones actually meant to be
kept secret.200 A different password or passphrase accesses this
false drive and TrueCrypt recommends that the user store
some files in this section that appear sensitive but that can
become public.201 Under such a set-up, when compelled, the user
can give the authorities the password to this false location.
This allows him to seemingly comply with the compulsion
order, but still keep his real secret files hidden.202
B.

Middle Ground

To alleviate these problems, America must seek a
middle ground between the current American approach and the
British approach. Such a middle ground would be well served
by incorporating the unique strengths of each approach, and
avoiding some of their pitfalls.
Leaving the issue solely to the judiciary on a case by
case basis would likely create uncertainty and leave the
government ill-equipped to gain the plaintext they need to
prosecute violations of the law. Because of this, a statutory
solution is needed, and a bill should be passed that creates a
standardized procedure that government agents must follow in
order to get an order compelling decryption. The American
government’s response to wiretapping is instructive, for
wiretapping
similarly
involved
the
intersection
of
constitutional protections and modern technology. Fourth
Amendment issues raised by wiretapping were initially
handled by the judiciary; first in Olmstead v. United States,203
200

See TrueCrypt, Hidden Volume, http://www.truecrypt.org/hiddenvolume
(last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
201
Id. (“[Y]ou should copy some sensitive-looking files that you actually do
NOT want to hide. These files will be there for anyone who would force you to hand
over the password.”).
202
Id. (“[I]t is impossible to prove whether there is a hidden volume within it
or not, because free space on any TrueCrypt volume is always filled with random data
when the volume is created and no part of the (dismounted) hidden volume can be
distinguished from random data.” (emphasis added)).
203
277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Court held wiretapping did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because they were reluctant to expand Fourth Amendment protections
beyond the literal language of the text).
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and later in Katz v. United States204. Then, in 1968, Congress
passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (“Omnibus Crime Control Act”), which functionally took
the wiretapping issue out of the hands of the judiciary.205
This new statute laid out a detailed set of procedures,
discussed below, that police must follow in order to be granted
permission to run a wiretap.206 From this statute, and the
above-discussed experiences of the American and British
approaches to compelled decryption, a number of
recommendations for a statutory middle ground can be made.
First, there should be an absolute prerequisite of prior
approval by a member of the judiciary for the grant of a
compelled decryption order. The Omnibus Crime Control Act
contains a similar requirement with regards to prior judicial
approval for wiretaps.207 Such a requirement would likely ease
some of the criticism that would be leveled at a RIPA-like bill
in America.208 Congress should not incorporate the portions of
RIPA that allow compelled decryption orders to be authorized
by non-judicial actors like high-ranking police, Customs and
Excise, and military officers.
Second, Congress would have to account for the fact that
the act of being compelled to produce a password or an
encryption key can communicate any of the three incriminating
Fisher elements: the existence of the plaintext, the defendant’s
control over the plaintext, and the authenticity of the
204

389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Court overruled Olmstead holding that the
protections of the Fourth Amendment extended to a government listening device
attached a phone booth because it constituted a search).
205
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102522 (2006).
206
Id. § 2518.
207
Id. § 2518(1) (“Each application for an order authorizing or approving the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall be
made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall
state the applicant’s authority to make such application.”).
208
An example of the American preference for prior judicial approval can be
found in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding search warrants. The Supreme
Court has stated its preference for neutral magistrates, and not police officers
personally involved in criminal investigations, to issue search warrants. Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (stating a preference for search warrant decisions
to be made “by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”); see also Mark
Tran,
RIP
Bill
and
Civil
Liberties,
GUARDIAN,
June
12,
2000,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/jun/12/qanda.marktran
(quoting
British
“inventor of the world wide web” Tim Berner-Lee as stating RIPA “would have been
thrown out in the US ‘in a second’” as it “gives the government great power to abuse
personal liberties” and commercial innovation).
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plaintext.209 This could be accomplished by requiring, through
means unrelated to the defendant’s act of producing the
password, proof of the existence of the plaintext, proof that the
defendant has control of the plaintext, and proof that the
plaintext is authentic.210 The standard of proof by which the
government would have to prove each of these elements, in
keeping with the Omnibus Crime Control Act,211 could be
probable cause.
Third, a compelled decryption order should only be
available for a certain list of specifically enumerated crimes.
Such an approach was taken in the Omnibus Crime Control
Act, which limits the types of crimes for which a wiretap may
be sought.212 Commensurate with the serious intrusion on
privacy, compelled decryption orders should only be available
to law enforcement when the serious nature of the crime merits
compelled disclosure.
Fourth, for a compelled decryption order, Congress
should require that the government agent meet a heavy burden
of proof in order to receive judicial approval.213 In the Omnibus
Crime Control Act, the burden of proof typically required is
probable cause,214 and that same level could be applied in a new
compelled decryption statute. This burden could function on
several fronts. First, the government should prove that the
subject of the order is actually in possession of the encryption
key or password.215 Second, the government should demonstrate
that it has exhausted all other possible methods of obtaining
the plaintext short of compelled disclosure.216 Third, the
209

See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
The idea the government should be required to account for each of the
three Fisher elements was proposed in an article by Aaron M. Clemens. See Clemens,
supra note 27, at 1. Mr. Clemens recommended that the burden for proving each of
these elements should be clear and convincing evidence. Id. Notably, this concept rings
of the foregone conclusion doctrine in that if the government can already prove the
three assertions of Fisher, nothing would be gained by compelling disclosure, and any
incriminating assertions accompanying the act of production would be a foregone
conclusion. See supra text accompanying notes 104-106.
211
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d).
212
Id. § 2516(1).
213
This burden could, for example, be proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even
clear and convincing evidence.
214
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).
215
Cf. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, ch. 23, § 49(2)(a) (Eng.).
RIPA only requires that there by “reasonable grounds” to believe that the person
served with the section 49 notice actually be in possession of the key, and a higher
standard of proof would be better suited to a new American approach. Id.
216
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (Judge may only authorize wiretap if “normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be
210
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government should demonstrate that the plaintext it seeks
goes to a material issue of their investigation.217 Lastly, the
government should prove that one of the specifically
enumerated crimes has been, or is about to be, committed.218
Fifth, it is likely that an equivalent to RIPA’s Section 54
gag order would not pass muster in America.219 Based on the
controversy surrounding similar provisions related to National
Security Letters, any compelled disclosure statute would wisely
omit any analogous section.
Sixth, the compelled decryption statute should precisely
lay out the technical procedures that must be followed in order
to obtain a compelled decryption order. For example, in
borrowing from features of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, the
statute could require that the application for the compelled
decryption order include factual details pertaining to the
identity of the suspect,220 the physical location and description
of the electronic files to be decrypted,221 the other methods the
police have exhausted to get the plaintext,222 and the factual
details from the investigation that have led the police to believe
that the suspect has committed, or is about to commit, a
crime.223
CONCLUSION
As the use of encryption becomes increasingly prevalent,
governments will face a growing need to develop a
comprehensive and coordinated response to situations where
powerful encryption stands between the government and
valuable evidence. The responses by Great Britain and
America, while entirely different, are uniquely problematic.
Nonetheless, the lessons of each, in addition to the Omnibus
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous”). RIPA only requires that it not be
“reasonably practicable” to acquire the plaintext in another manner. See Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 49(2)(d). A higher standard of proof would be better
suited to a new statutory approach to compelled decryption.
217
This would ensure that compelled decryption orders were only being used
when absolutely necessary for the successful prosecution of a crime.
218
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (Judge may only authorize wiretap if there is
“probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about
to commit a particular offense”).
219
See supra text accompanying notes 189-194.
220
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b).
221
Id.
222
Id. § 2518(1)(c).
223
Id. § 2518(1)(b).
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Crime Control Act, offer valuable insight into the creation of a
more enlightened statutory approach.
The British statutory response very effectively gives law
enforcement the ability to compel decryption in furtherance of
criminal investigations, but it does so at too high a cost to civil
liberties. The American approach, as exemplified by Judge
Niedermeier’s opinion in Boucher, does an excellent job of
protecting civil liberties, but leaves law enforcement severely
handicapped in its ability to investigate and prosecute serious
crimes. Criminals with even minimal technical expertise are
able to hide their activities behind virtually unbreakable walls
of encryption, and the American government would be
practically powerless to access the evidence.
Thus, while both the British and American approaches
to compelled decryption are valuable, they are also fraught
with their own unique difficulties. Consequently, America
should seek a middle ground that better takes into account the
competing ideals of civil liberty and law enforcement interests.
Brendan M. Palfreyman†

†

B.A., Haverford College, J.D. candidate, 2010, Brooklyn Law School. I
would like to thank the members of the Brooklyn Law Review, especially Andrei
Takhteyev and Joseph Roy, for their tireless efforts. Thanks also to my mom, dad,
brother, sister, nieces, Chase, Hudson, and Kimberlee.

